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This study investigated the difference between males 
and females in their approach towards risk in the social 
dating situation, and the degree to which risk mediates the 
individual's assessment of potential dating partners. Other 
major factors considered were the physical attractiveness of 
the potential date, the probability of acceptance by the 
potential date, and secondarily, the subject's physical 
attractiveness, self-esteem; and willingness to incur risk 
in a non-interpersonal situation. The subjects, 30 males 
and 30 females, were asked to rate three photographs of 
potential date partners with the understanding that an 
actual date might result. Results indicate that all 
subjects were strongly influenced by the physical 
attractiveness of the potential dates and probability of 
acceptance in their overall rating and choice of potential 
dates. 
With respect to risk, females demonstrated risk 
aversion in the dating paradigm, while males did not. These 
results were not affected when the self-esteem, physical 
attractiveness, and riskiness of the subject were 
statistically controlled. 
3 
Risk Seeking and Risk 
Aversion In the Social Dating Situation 
Social-exchange theory (Homans, 1950, 1961; Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959) appears to be an adequate and well accepted 
framework for conceptualizing attraction behaviors between 
individuals. Berscheid and Walster (1974), McKelvie and 
Matthews (1976), and Dermer and Thiel (1975) together 
describe an abundance of research studies which demonstrate 
that socially desirable traits and a lack of 
psychopathological traits can be considered rewarding 
qualities, and socially undesirable traits such as 
egocentrism can be considered punishing or cost properties. 
Social-exchange theory asserts that attraction towards 
another individual increases with rewards, and decreases 
with costs. This paper will accept this framework in 
describing the experimental project. First, a number of 
concepts that aid in the elaboration of this theory will be 
delineated. 
Utility and Decision. Social exchange theory deals 
with interpersonal behaviors in terms of rewards and costs. 
One way of conceptualizing and quantifying these rewards and 
costs is in terms of utilities or subjective utilities. 
Utility can be defined as the quality or property of 
something as useful. Things possessing utility might be 
described as able to serve some practical use. For example, 
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street signs are of practical use to the public in general, 
as the automobile is to the individual. In a sense, money 
or the monetary value of something, can be thought of as at 
least a first approximation to a measure of utility. Money 
provides a standard which, barring fluctions in its value, 
is a relatively stable means of quantifying the utility of 
things. The use of this concept in discussing various 
issues has been well accepted at least since Bernoulli's 
18th century essays (Bernoulli, 1738/1954) on decision 
making. 
In each decisional alternative there are possible gains 
(rewards) and probabilities of gain, and there are possible 
losses (costs) and probabilities of loss. In most real life 
decisional situations there are often many potential 
outcomes. If one were to try to characterize these multiple 
outcomes with a single number, probably the best 
characterization would be the mean or expected value (EV) of 
the distribution of outcomes. The EV is defined as the 
average long-term outcome. The EV for situations where 
there are many possible outcomes can be calculated as 
follows. EV is equal to the sum of products between all 
possible outcome utilities (both positive and negative) and 
all corresponding outcome probabilities. Since there are 
many potential, outcomes there are many potential outcome 
utilities, positive and negative (Ui), and many potential 
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outcome probabilities, (Pi). If there are (n) possible 
outcomes utilities, and (n) corresponding probabilities, the 
EV of a situation/alternative is the sum of Ui times Pi, or 
mathematically, EV = r(UiPi). 
Social exchange theory portrays the person as a more or 
less rational decision maker who attempts to assess his 
alternatives with respect to expected gains and losses1 
However, research on decision during uncertainty (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) suggests that several 
modifications on this prescriptive model are necessary to 
predict how people make such decisions. 
It appears that people do not act directly in 
accordance with actual utilities expressed as money. 
Rather, they incorporate utility into their decision process 
in a subjective manner. Bernoulli (1738/1954) suggested 
that utility is a non-linear function of money. Individuals 
faced with decisional alternatives do not act on the 
rational outcome value (EV) , but rather they act in 
accordance with their own subjective assessment of the 
outcome. Thus, in a decision-analytic framework, utility is 
better conceptualized as "subjective utility" (Edwards, 
1954). In a lottery situation, for example, there is 
potential loss in the form of ticket ccst should the 
participant lose, and potential gain in the form of prize 
money should he win. The rational model accommodates the 
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subjectivity associated with the utilities by labeling the 
gain and loss as "subjective weighted utilities" (SU) . The 
subjective utilities associated with the cost of the ticket 
and the gain of the prize money are not equivalent to the 
respective monetary values. 
Bernoulli proposed that people behave in a manner which 
will maximize expected utility (SU), rather than expected 
value (EV). He stated that utility forms a special type of 
function. This function more than a century later was 
formulated by Fechner for subjective magnitudes in general 
(Fechner, 1966). Specifically, Bernoulli stated that 
subjective value, or utility, forms a concave function with 
money. More recently, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) also 
found that the SU of individuals facing a decision is 
non-linear in money. They report that EV forms a concave 
function with respect to gains, and that EV forms a convex 
function with respect to loss. For example, in terms of 
either gain or loss, people tend to view the difference in 
utility between $100 and $200 as greater than that between 
$1200 and $1300. Again, each decisional alternative has 
certain SUs, and they do not appear to form a linear 
function with dollar value. 
In addition to the SU of each alternative, the 
individual assigns "subjective probabilities" (SPr)· to each 
of the outcomes. A clarification of terms is necessary 
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here. The phrase subjective probability has in past been 
used in two ways: as a name for a school of thought about 
the logical basis of mathematical probability (Good, 1950; 
DeFinetti, 1951), and as a name for a transformation of 
mathematical probabilities which is in some fashion related 
to behavior; the latter will be used here. Using the 
lottery situation again, the individual assesses his 
alternatives and arrives at his own subjective understanding 
of the probabilities of gain or loss. Thus, upon making any 
decision between alternatives the individual possesses 
subjective utilities (how good or bad the outcome might be) 
and subjective probabilities (how likely it is that a given 
outcome will occur). It is necessary to alter the model 
once again. Since utilities have been replaced with 
subjective utilities, and probabilities have been replaced 
with subjective probabilities, it follows that the overall 
expected value (EV) would be better considered as the 
subjective expected utility (SEU). The subjective utility 
of gain and subjective utility of loss will be identified as 
SUg, and SUl respectively; the subjective probability of 
gain and subjective probability of loss will be labled SPrg, 
and SPrl, respectively. Hence, expanded here to illustrate 
all components: SEU = (SUg x SPrg) - (SUl x SPrl). 
Risk. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) report that 
individuals facing uncertainty demonstrate risk averse or 
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risk seeking behavior depending on whether the situation is 
within the domain of gains or the domain of loss, 
respectively. A preference for a sure outcome over a gamble 
that has an equal or higher EV demonstrates risk averse 
behavior. The rejection of a sure thing in favor of a 
gamble of equal or lower EV demonstrates risk seeking 
behavior. For example, suppose an individual has the choice 
between a gamble that offers an 85% chance to win $1000 
(with a 15% chance to win nothing) and the alternative of 
receiving $800 for sure. The EV of this gamble is ($1000 x 
.85) - ($0 x .15) = $850. This EV exceeds the expectation 
of $800 associated with the sure thing, thus a preference 
for the sure gain is an instance of risk aversion. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1984) demonstrated that when faced with a sure 
gain people do in fact prefer the sure thing over the 
gamble, despite the gamble having a greater expected value. 
The following example illustrates risk seeking. 
An individual is faced with choosing between a gamble 
with an 85% chance to lose $1000 (with a 15% chance to lose 
nothing), and a sure loss of $800. The EV of the gamble is 
-$850, whereas the expectation of the sure loss is -$800. 
An expression of preference for the gamble over the sure 
loss would be an example of risk seeking behavior. Several 
investigators have found support for risk seeking behavior 
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in the domain of loss (Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979; Payne, 
Laughhunn, & Crum, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
As stated above, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) assert 
that the value function which people hold for decisional 
alternatives is non-linear in money, being concave in the 
domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. This 
non-linear function allows for an explanation of risk averse 
and risk seeking behavior across the two domains. Figure 1 
illustrates both risk seeking and risk aversion. The right 
side of the figure shows how in gains SEU becomes 
increasingly underweighted as potential gains increase and 
the individual becomes increasingly risk averse. Similarly, 
the left side of the figure shows that as the amount to be 
lost increases, the SEU of potential losses is overweighted 
-------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here 
and the individual becomes increasingly risk seeking. It 
appears from Kahneman and Tversky's findings that SEU 
(operationalized as preference) is not equivalent to EV. 
Under conditions of uncertainty SEU and EV differ. It 
should be noted that at this point in the present discussion 
SEU is calculated with the assumption that the element of 
risk has no intrinsic value. Preference is dependent only 
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upon SEU defined as the sum of the products of subjective 
utility and subjective probability. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1984), individuals 
facing decisions tend to be risk seeking or risk averse not 
only because of the non-linearity of utility in money as 
discussed above (Bernoulli, 1738,1954; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984), but additionally because of the non-linearity of 
subjective probabilities in the probabilities of decisional 
alternatives. For example, a lottery ticket tends to be 
thought of as having higher value when its probability of 
winning increases from 0% to 5% or 95% to 100% than when 
that increase is from 40% to 45%. "A change from 
impossibility to possibility or from possibility to 
certainty has a bigger impact (on subjective value) than a 
comparable change in the middle of the scale" (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984, p.344). Except for the end points of the 
distribution, Kahneman and Tversky found that the weights 
given to decisions were regressive with respect to stated 
probabilities (see Figure 2). Therefore, the majority of 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
actual decision weights (subjective probabilities) were 
lower than their corresponding (objective) probabilities. 
People tend to discount moderate and high probabilities (in 
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gains) relative to sure things, and this underweighting 
contributes to risk aversion. That is, when faced with a 
sure gain the individual tends to decrease the value of the 
gamble, even when that gamble maintains a higher EV than the 
sure thing, and prefers the sure gain. This discounting of 
moderate probabilities also leads people to be risk seeking 
(in losses) by decreasing the aversiveness of a negative 
gamble, i.e., when faced with a sure loss and the 
probability function is convex, the gamble is perceived as 
more attractive. As will be noted subsequently, this 
regressive tendency for subjective probabilities may be 
characteristic of lotteries and not generalized to all 
decisions under uncertainty. 
Further, at the low probability end of the probability 
curve, it appears that subjective probabilities are 
enhanced, relative to objective probabilities. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984) found that low and very low probabilities 
tend to be enhanced. Thus, in this region of probability 
the subjective expected utility of "long shots" is enhanced 
while the aversiveness of a small chance of severe loss is 
increased. People are risk seeking with improbable gains 
(buying lottery tickets) and risk averse with improbable 
losses (buying insurance policies). 
Risk As Value. An alternative explication of risk 
aversion and risk seeking assumes that risk itself may have 
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intrinsic value, either as a gain or as a loss. Portfolio 
theory (Coombs & Huang, 1970) states that there is a 
preferred level of risk at each level of expected value, and 
that an individual will maximize expected value in a choice 
between wagers which deviate in risk the same amount from 
their respective ideal risk levels. The theory further 
states that preference is a function of expected value and 
perceived risk, and defines risk as the variability in the 
distribution of potential outcomes. 
Utilizing this theory allows the concept of risk to 
replace Kahneman and Tversky's concepts of non-linearity in 
explaining the difference between SEU and EV. It is 
believed that depending on one's personal value orientation 
towards risk, SEU may be discounted or enhanced relative to 
level of risk. However, it has been found that these 
orientations may be substantially affected by environmental 
circumstance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984) labled this a "framing effect". Thus, 
depending on the situation, which might be a game of chance 
or an interpersonal decision, risk itself may contribute a 
negative or a positive value to the overall SEU of an 
alternative. 
The question of whether or not there are empirically 
testable differences between the Kahneman and Tversky 
approach (non-linearity of utility and probability) and 
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Portfolio theory (intrinsic value of risk) is controversial 
(Payne, 1973). In any case, the present project was not 
aimed at constructing such a test. Rather, it incorporated 
Portfolio theory as a working model because of its appealing 
conceptual and computational simplicity relative to the 
Kahneman and Tversky formulation. 
Probability Distribution. Any gamble, wager, or 
lottery has an outcome probability distribution. For 
example, a lottery in which there is some probability, P, of 
a gain, G, and some probability, (1-P) of a loss, L, has a 
probability distribution that can be specified as: X = G 
with probability P, and L. with probability (1-P). 
Throughout this discussion it will be assumed that G ~ 0, 
and L < 0. This distribution has a mean, or expected value, 
E(X) = GP + L(1-P), and a variance of VAR(X) = P(1-P) (G-L) 2 • 
This variability represents the level of uncertainty or risk 
of any gamble (Coombs & Bowen, 1971; Coombs & Huang, 1976). 
As the formula indicates there are two components of 
the variability in this probability distribution. The first 
involves the combined probabilities of the outcomes. 
Decreasing the differences between outcome probabilities 
leads to increased variability. It can easily be shown that 
the quantity P(1-P), where 1 > P > 0, has its maximum value 
at P = (1-P) = .5. Again, it is reasonable to interpret 
this component of variability in terms of uncertainty or 
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risk because a wager with two equally likely outcomes is 
intuitively more uncertain or riskier than one in which the 
probability of one outcome is closer to 1. Therefore, an 
alternative with 90% chance of gain and 10% chance of loss 
is less risky than an alternative with a 50% chance of gain 
and loss. It is also true, albeit less intuitively 
compelling, that an alternative with a 90% chance of loss 
and a 10% chance of gain is less risky than an alternative 
with a 50% chance of gain and loss. 
The second component of the variance of the probability 
distribution involves the potential gains and losses. 
Variability (or risk) is increased by increasing either 
potential gain or potential loss. Since the potential gain 
(G) is conceptualized as a non-negative number, and the 
potential loss (L) is a non-positive number, variability 
increases as the square of the sum of the absolute value of 
each of these quantities. The idea that the riskiness of a 
wager increases with the amount at stake (!GI+ILi) 2 is 
intuitively compelling. For example, a decisional 
alternative with a potential gain of $2 and loss of $2, 
(!GI+IL!) 2 = $16, is intuitively less risky than one with 
potential gain of $20 and loss of $20, (!GI+ILi) 2 = $1600. 
As has been discussed, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) have 
noted the preference for the "long shot" in wagering, and 
have attributed this preference to an overvaluing or 
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enhancement of very low subjective probabilities in 
otherwise risk averse situations. This phenomenon can be 
reconciled with Portfolio theory as follows. In a risk 
averse situation, SEU is discounted by the intrinsic value 
of risk, that is, by the variability of the probability 
distribution. However, situations in which P is small (long 
shots) will have low variabilities (therefore less risk), 
will result in high SEU's, and thus will be preferred to 
moderate values of P. 
From the preceding discussion it is reasonable to 
assume that increased variability in the outcome 
distribution (or risk) should lead to an increase in 
preference for a given alternative, if the individual is 
weighting risk positively (demonstrating risk seeking 
behavior). Increasing the variability of the outcome 
distribution may also lead to a decrease in preference if 
the individual is weighting risk negatively (demonstrating 
risk averse behavior) • 
Portfolio theory implies another theoretical formula, 
different from that discussed above, which provides a 
different means of conceptualizing SEU, and a different 
means of explaining risk averse and risk seeking behavior. 
It is a less complex formula which does not make reference 
to the concepts of non-linearity in value and probabilities. 
In order to conceptualize SEU as a weighted average, EV and 
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the variance (risk component) will be weighted with T as the 
weight associated with expected gains and losses, and (1-T) 
as the weight associated with the value of risk. Hence, we 
have SEU = T(EV) +/- (1-T) (VAR), which expands to 
SEU = T [GP+L(1-P)] + (1-T) [P(1-P) (iGI+ILil 2 J 
in risk seeking, and 
SEU = T [GP+L(1-P)] - (1-T) [P(1-P) ( IGI +ILl) 2 J 
in risk aversion. According to Portfolio theory, then, the 
subjective expected utility of a given gamble is a weighted 
average of the expectations of gain and loss, and the 
variability (risk) of the gamble. 
Utilizing this formula we can explain risk averse 
behavior as follows. An individual is faced with the 
decision situation in the domain of gains: he must choose 
between a sure gain of $800 (EV = $800), and an 85% chance 
of winning $1000 (EV = $850). If the individual is risk 
averse, in some manner he/she will alter the EV of the risky 
alternative so that the SEU of the sure thing is greater 
than that of the gamble. 
Regarding the sure thing alternative, the Portfolio 
theory formula reduces to SEU = TGP because L = 0 and (1-P) 
= 0. Since there is no risk, the weight assigned to risk 
becomes 0, thus T = 1~ and we know that if P = 1, then SEU = 
G = $800. Regarding the uncertain wager alternative (with L 
= 0 in the gain situation), the formula is SEU = TGP -
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(1-T) [P(1-P)G 2]. Substituting the values P = .85 and G = 
$1000, gives SEU = 850T- 127500(1-T). Even if the weight 
assigned to risk (1-T) is very small (greater than .0015), 
then the sure thing would be preferred over the uncertain 
wager alternative. 
To demonstrate how the Portfolio theory formula 
explains risk seeking behavior we observe the decision 
situation in the domain of loss. The individual must choose 
between a sure loss of $800 (EV = -$800), and an 85% chance 
of losing $1000 (EV = -$850). To be acting in a risk 
seeking manner, the individual must alter the EV of the 
risky alternative so that its SEU is greater than that of 
the sure thing. 
Similar to the situation above, the SEU of the sure 
thing alternative has values G = 0, (1-P) = 0, the weight 
assigned to risk = 0, T = 1, and again the formula reduces 
to SEU = L = -$800. But, now the SEU of the gamble must be 
overweighted to become more preferred. With G = 0, we have 
SEU = TL(1-P) + (1-T) [P(1-P) (L) 2J. Substituting the values 
P = .85 and L = $1000, leaves SEU = 150T + 127500(1-T). 
Again, even if the wieght assigned to risk (1-T) is small 
(greater than .0015), then SEU > -$800, and the gamble would 
be preferred over the sure thing. 
Figure 3 illustrates the preference curve which the 
Portfolio theory formula produces with value T equal to 
18 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
.9985. A comparision of Figure 3 with Figure 1 demonstrates 
that Portfolio theory provides a reasonable account of the 
risk aversion phenomenon discussed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984). 
In summary, Portfolio theory is an alternative model 
for explaining preference in certain situations. SEU has an 
additional factor of risk added to EV in risk seeking, and 
it has the risk factor subtracted from EV in risk aversion. 
Non-monetary situations. Because most decisional 
situations involve potential loss and gain, and possess 
different levels of risk, Portfolio theory can be used to 
conceptualize the components of many non-monetary decision 
situations. An example of a non-monetary decisional 
situation might be where an individual is faced with the 
choice of whom to invite to a social event. The individual 
knows many different potential partners, some of whom may be 
more preferred than others {differential gain), and some of 
whom may accept or not accept the invitation {differential 
probability of gain). Assuming the individual does not wish 
to be rejected, he/she is faced with weighing each potential 
partner as an alternative with certain SO's, SPr's and 
potentially some element of risk. 
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In many respects the non-monetary decision situation 
resembles the gamble or wager situation that was first 
discussed. When an individual is faced with a choice 
between $800 for sure and an 85% chance at $1000, we have 
conceptualized this choice dilemma as a situation in which 
the person implicitly calculates the SEU for each, and 
ultimately selects that alternative with the higher SEU. 
This comparison of alternatives has been conceptualized in 
non-monetary situations by Thibaut and Kelley (1959) in 
terms of the comparison level for alternatives. 
In the area of interpersonal interaction and attraction 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) state that there is a minimum 
level which people hold called the comparison level for 
alternatives (CLalt), with which they weigh their 
interactions with others (alternatives) in terms of the 
rewards or costs incurred in that interaction. CLalt is 
defined as the outcome of the "best" available alternative. 
For example, how much a person, A, will be attracted to 
another person, B, depends upon whether the outcomes which A 
obtains from B are above or below A's CLalt. If the 
outcomes in a given relationship surpass CLalt, that 
relationship is regarded as satisfactory. If the outcomes 
attained are below CLalt, person A is dissatisfied and may 
terminate the relationship. The analogy to the wagering 
situation is that the choice of $800 for sure constitutes 
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the person's CLalt. So long as a risky choice has a SEU 
above this CLalt it will be chosen. If the SEU of the risky 
choice is below CLalt it will be rejected. 
Despite this formal similarity, there is evidence which 
suggests how the non-monetary situation is dissimilar to the 
monetary one. It would be naive to assume that people 
approach all non-monetary situations as they do monetary 
ones. For example, in a monetary lottery situation the 
individual purchases one lottery ticket in hopes of his/her 
number being chosen at random. The individual might know 
the odds of his/her ticket number being chosen but he/she 
has no way to affect whether or not his/her ticket is 
actually chosen. Yet, in a non-monetary situation, such as 
an interpersonal relationship, the individual may see a 
multitude of ways of having some form of personal control 
over events and eventual outcomes, and thus his/her behavior 
in choosing alternatives may be substantially altered. A 
person's behavior seems heavily influenced by the sense of 
control. 
Langer (1975) performed a series of studies on a 
phenomenon he termed the "illusion of control" involving 
playing cards, lottery tickets, a novel chance game, and 
confident or nervous (confederate) competitors. Langer 
demonstrated that in certain situations, people act as if 
objectively uncontrollable events are, in fact, 
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controllable. It appears that when certain elements 
typically associated with skill (e.g., practice, 
competition, choice) are brought into situations in which 
outcomes are objectively uncontrollable, expectancies of 
personal success are inappropriately higher than the 
objective probabilities would warrant. Given a situation in 
which personal influence over events is in any way 
plausible, people demonstrate an illusion of control. 
Prior work by the current authors (Parra & Phillips, 
1984) on the phenomenon of "unrealistic optimism" 
(Weinstein, 1980) illustrates another means of how people 
cognitively distort probability of personal success. In 
unrealistic optimism the individual estimates his own chance 
of success as greater, relative to his peers. In the Parra 
and Phillips (1984) study subjects were asked to state how 
likely, relative to their college peers, they felt they 
would experience a success, or avoid a failure. Subjects 
demonstrated a strong bias towards optimistic expectation in 
many non-monetary future life situations, e.g., personal 
health, academic, employment, and marital success. However, 
in the area of monetary chance situations (winning a 
lottery, success in the stock market) subjects did not 
respond with unrealistic expectation. It appears than in 
certain areas in the domain of non-monetary gains people 
overweight the probability of success in situations 
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involving risk. It may be that the regressive assessment of 
subjective probabilities occurs in lottery situations 
wherein the "illusion of control" is not very salient. 
However, in other situations, interpersonal relations, for 
example, this illusion may be more salient, and the reverse 
(overestimation of subjective probability) occurs. Thus, in 
an area such as interpersonal relationships the "unrealistic 
optimism" or "illusion of control" phenomena could 
potentially offset or even reverse the regressive assessment 
of subjective probabilities noted by Kahneman and Tversky 
{1984). 
Attraction. It is clear that the concept of reward is 
important in interpersonal relations (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959), and reward value attributed to another person has 
been viewed in terms of interpersonal attraction {Newcomb, 
1960; Byrne, 1971). At this point a review is presented of 
those factors which have been found to contribute to 
interpersonal attraction. 
There is evidence that attitudinal similarity produces 
attraction or "liking" {Newcomb, 1961; Byrne, 1971), and 
that attraction causes the perception of similarity (Byrne & 
Wong, 1962). Similarity of personal attributes has been 
found to be related to attraction in a number of diverse 
ways: attraction to a stranger has been found to be greatly 
affected by the similarity of his economic status {Byrne, 
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Clore, & Worchel, 1977); people have been found to select as 
friends others who are closer to their own height 
(Berkowitz, 1969); and a consistent relationship has been 
found between attraction to a stranger and personality 
similarity as measured by the Repression-Sensitization Scale 
(Byrne, Griffitt, & Stephanie, 1967). 
From a somewhat different point of view, Winch (1958) 
theorized interpersonal attraction not on attribute 
similarity but rather on attribute difference, i.e., 
attribute complementarity and complementary needs. His 
research focused on the role of personality "match" in mate 
selection and investigated to what extent "opposites 
attract". Some evidence exists that suggests that 
complementarity may be important only at certain times in an 
ongoing relationship. Kerckhoff and Davis (1962) performed 
a longitudinal study involving college couples as their 
relationship progressed toward marriage. It was found that 
in the early stages of the relationship consensus on 
attitudes and values were most critical in predicting 
whether or not the relationship would continue, and only 
later in the relationship did need complementarity become 
the most important determinant. 
Triandis (1977) reported that certain behaviors 
exhibited by one individual towards others tend to increase 
the other's attraction to the individual. These behaviors 
included the giving of love, status, information, money, 
goods, or services to another. 
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Environmental characteristics have also been found to 
influence interpersonal attraction. Griffitt and Veitch 
(1971) subjected college students to crowding, high 
humidity, and high temperature, and found more attraction in 
the normal than in the hot-temperature and more attraction 
in the low than in the high-populated conditions. 
The direction of causality in the relationship between 
propinquity and attraction has been a matter of dispute: 
either attraction leads to propinquity, or propinquity leads 
to attraction. A number of studies have found a positive 
effect of mere exposure on attraction (Harrison, 1969; 
Zajonc & Rajecki, 1969; Zajonc, Swap, Harrison, & Roberts, 
1971). Saegert, Swap, and Zajonc (1973) accounted for 
context in their design and found attraction varying as a 
direct function of exposure, in both positive and negative 
contexts. Yet some of the strongest evidence towards 
settling the dispute comes from a classic study by 
Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) who found that 
proximity and increasing the liklihood of interaction among 
similar individuals leads to higher rates of interaction and 
interpersonal attraction. Segal (1974), using subjects with 
similar backgrounds, found a .92 correlation between 
proximity (physical position in a line) and individuals 
chosen as friends. 
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In the dating paradigm Walster, Aronson, Abrahams, and 
Rottmann (1966) found that independent of the individual's 
own level of attractiveness the most significa~t factor in 
determining a) the extent his dating partner was liked, b) 
the desire to date the partner again, and c) the frequency 
of actually asking the partner out, was the level of 
physical attractiveness of the partner. Neither personality 
measures, such as the MMPI, Minnesota Counseling Inventory, 
and Berger's Scale of self-Acceptance, nor intellectual 
measures, such as the Minnesota Scholastic Aptitude Test, 
and high school percentile rank, were able to predict couple 
compatibility. The date's physical attractiveness was the 
only significant determinant of the individual's liking for 
his date. 
The importance of physical attractiveness as a 
determinant of attraction has been supported by many other 
investigators. Brislin and Lewis (1968) found a .89 
correlation between the perceived physical attractiveness of 
a computer-dance-date and "desire to date the partner 
again"; while Tesser and Brodie (1971) found a .69 
correlation between the same two variables. In both studies 
physical attractiveness correlated higher with "desire to 
date again" than any other perceived characteristics 
including "similar interests" and "character". 
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In a number of laboratory and natural settings 
reciprocity has been identified as an important factor in 
attraction (Newcomb, 1961; Tagiuri, Blake, & Bruner, 1953). 
Blumberg (1969) found that subjects were happiest not only 
when their friends liked them, but also when their enemies 
disliked them. Blumberg's subjects reported desiring a 
decrease in asymmetry rather than an increase, even when 
this meant being less well liked rather than better liked. 
These findings are examples of the "strain toward symmetry" 
within dyads proposed by Newcomb (1953), and they are 
consistent with Heider's (1958) balance theory. One is 
expected to feel uneasy about unbalanced situations, and 
thereby to be motivated to strive for balance. 
Miller and Geller (1972) found that in the perception 
of their own relationships, and those of others, subjects 
perceived relationships as stable only when both individuals 
in the dyad shared the same attitude toward the other 
{mutual liking, disliking, neutrality, or ambivalence). 
Further, it seems that what might be termed a "need" for· 
reciprocity is implied in Newcomb's {1968) report that there 
is a strong tendency to exaggerate the degree to which one's 
own attraction· toward another person is reciprocated at 
about the same level. As one individual shows liking and 
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acceptance toward another, that other person is increasingly 
inclined to reciprocate acceptance and liking. The 
importance of reciprocity suggests an important role for 
both acceptance and degree of acceptance. 
Goffman in 1952 developed the "Matching Hypothesis" 
(Goffman, 1952) for social interaction. Each person 
maintains a sum of social attributes which are presumably 
determined by his/her level of social skills, intelligence, 
access to such material resources as money and prestige, 
physical attractiveness, and possession of the generally 
socially valued characteristics. It is believed that 
romantic aspiration is influenced by similar factors to 
those that influence level of aspiration in other areas 
(Walster et al., 1966). These factors are the desirability 
of the goal and perceived probability of attaining it. 
While socially desirable people ought to be preferred by 
everyone, the perceived probability of obtaining their 
attention and esteem ought to vary with the person's own 
social desirability. Thus, for romantic liaisons people 
should select, and like best, those of their own social 
desirability level. 
Berscheid, Dion, Walster, and Walster (1971) found 
support for the matching principle in two experiments they 
conducted. In their study they had subjects "actively" 
choose a date partner, while the salience of possible 
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rejection by the chosen date was emphasized. The physical 
attractiveness of subjects and dates was independently rated 
by judges. While physically attractive dates were markedly 
preferred by all subjects, it was apparent that men and 
women of lesser attractiveness tended to choose less 
attractive dates than highly attractive subjects. It is 
likely that people tend to pair off in level of 
attractiveness from assessing their probability of 
acceptance. An individual who views him or herself as lower 
in attractiveness is likely to assess his/her probability of 
acceptance as low with all but those of similar or a lower 
level of attractiveness. Thus, interaction attempts are 
aimed primarily at others who are preceived as similar in 
attractiveness, wherein probability of acceptance is 
perceived as greater. 
From the preceding literature review it is apparent 
that there are indeed many.relevant factors involved in 
interpersonal attraction. Yet, as detailed earlier, there 
are but two major considerations in the rational model of 
decision making, subjective utility and subjective 
probability. Therefore, if we are to use this model in 
investigating interpersonal relationships we must also focus 
upon the two most appropriate or suitable factors. They 
are: a) physical attractiveness, because of its importance 
in interpersonal attraction and because it seems to best 
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capture the idea of subjective utility or gain; and b) 
probability of acceptance because it appears to best fit the 
concept of subjective probability. 
Shanteau and Nagy (1979) in a study using only female 
subjects found that in the dating situation both probability 
of acceptance and physical attractiveness of the date were 
important in the subjects' overall preference for dates. 
They presented subjects with a stimulus card containing two 
photographs of dates and two probability of acceptance 
phrases. The subjects were to assume that the phrase 
represented the male's reaction to her photograph. Each 
subject was given a number of stimulus cards in each of 
three sessions. However, Shanteau and Nagy report " ••• the 
subject was aware that she would not actually go out on a 
date ••• " Results showed that females were influenced both 
by probability of acceptance and physical attractiveness in 
dating choice, i.e., the main effects were significant, and 
subjects tended to combine probability with attractiveness 
in a multiplicative fashion, as indicated by the significant 
interaction of these variables. The SEU of the potential 
date appears to have been estimated by simply multiplying 
SUg (attractiveness of date) with Prg (probability of 
acceptance). Thus, Shanteau and Nagy provide substantial 
evidence for the formulation that makes SEU the product of 
gain (physical attractiveness) and probability of gain 
(probability of acceptance) in a situation involving 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
interpersonal attraction. Figure 4 illustrates mean 
preference responses from the Shanteau and Nagy (1979) 
subjects across four levels of attractiveness and seven 
levels of probability of acceptance. 
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Self-Esteem. Any attempt at assessing individual 
decision choice, particularly in the area of social 
interaction, would be improved with a consideration of 
individual self-esteem. This seems particularly relevant 
since interaction implies both action and reaction and it is 
believed that one's perceptions, correct or distorted, of 
others' reactions are an immediate determinant of 
self-concept. That an abundance of research on self-esteem 
exists (see Wylie, 1974, 1979) is understandable given the 
central role that how and what we think about ourselves 
plays in nearly all of what we do. It seems then quite 
plausible that self-esteem would influence our relations 
with others. 
Leonard (1975) reported that high-self-esteem subjects 
are less attracted to a dissimilar stranger and more 
attracted to a similar stranger than are low-self-esteem 
31 
subjects. However, Sachs (1976) provided subjects with both 
attitudinal information about a stranger and evaluations of 
the subject by that stranger, and failed to find a 
significant relationship between self-esteem and attraction 
to the stranger. Thus, research in this area is 
contradictory. 
Jones (1973) provides a thorough account of two basic 
theories of self-evaluation: self-consistency and 
self-esteem theory. To differentiate the two, he used the 
experimental situation wherein subjects are either high or 
low in self-evaluation and received either positive or 
negative evaluations from peers. He asked to what extent do 
these subjects accept or reject their peers. 
Consistency theory (Jones, 1973) predicts that 
individuals with high self-evaluations will view positive 
evaluations as consistent, and view negative evaluations as 
inconsistent. Similarly, individuals with low 
self-evaluations will view positive evaluations as 
inconsistent, and negative evaluations as consistent. Thus, 
high self-evaluators should react more favorably to approval 
than to disapproval and low self-evaluators will react more 
favorably to disapproval than to approval. 
Self-esteem theory (Jones, 1973) asserts that the 
individual strives towards enhancing his self-evaluation and 
to maintain, increase, or confirm his feelings of personal 
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worth and effectiveness. Thus, both high- and 
low-evaluators should respond more favorably to approval, 
and less favorably to disapproval. 
The major difference between the two theories is that 
the first is designed to acheive self-consistency, and the 
second at enchancing self-esteem. In self-consistency 
theory individuals adjust their cognitions and orient their 
relations with others so as to maintain similarity between 
their own evaluations and those they receive from others. 
The self-esteem theory assumes that the individual has a 
need for self-esteem which is satisfied primarily,by the 
approval he receives from others and is frustrated by their 
disapproval. To the extent that the esteem need is 
satisfied by other's evaluations, the individual will 
.. ,. 
respond favorably to them (Jones, 1973). 
Jones (1973) found that in spite of co~sistency theory 
being widely accepted, a stronger case can be made for 
self-esteem theory. This argument is supported by the 
.,. 
following factors: a) empirical experiments provide more 
substantial support for the self-esteem predictions, b) 
direct observation finds the self-derogator increasing in 
positive affect when given positive evaluation, and c) basic 
extensions of self-esteem are capable of explaining 
consistency predictions. Jones concludes stating that all 
people have a need to increase self-esteem and that this 
need is greater in low-self-esteem subjects. 
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Wylie (1979) reports in a major review of the 
self-esteem literature that significant positive 
correlations exist between scores representing self-regard 
and regard for "generalized others". She also finds 
"suggestive" evidence for the proposition that perceived 
acceptability to others is correlated with self-regard. 
However, she cautions the reader regarding the acceptability 
of the literature based on the "great methodological 
disparities" between the experimental designs. 
It follows, then, that subjects who are given different 
levels of evaluation would be likely to respond in a 
positive manner to the positive evalution whether they are 
high- or low-self-evaluators, and those subjects lower in 
self-evaluation would respond more positively than those 
higher in self-evaluation. In general, this appears to 
point towards the importance of assessing self-esteem in 
research on interpersonal relations for the possibility of 
its having any of these effects. 
Risk in Dating. It is hypothesized that risk may play 
a role in the non-monetary (dating) situation. Since a date 
is a type of gain it is further hypothesized that people 
would demonstrate risk averse behavior in this specific 
situation. It is hypothesized that the degree of risk 
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aversion will increase with the variability of the outcome, 
that is, as the subjective utility increases, risk aversion 
will increase, and as the subjective probabilities of gain 
increase (up from .5), risk aversion will increase. It 
should be pointed out that this effect diminishes the effect 
of the normative rule which states that as both EV and 
probability of gain increase, SEU increases. Because 
subjects will be demonstrating risk averse behavior, SEU 
will be lower than would normally be expected. 
Earlier research by the present author (Phillips and 
Parra, in preparation) found that females tended to rate a 
familiar (or "mundane") type of date more positively than an 
unfamiliar (or "exotic") date. In the first part of this 
study male and female subjects were asked to read a 
paragraph description of one of two different types of 
opposite sex dates with whom they were going to go out on a 
hypothetical date. The mundane date was described using 
personality traits and biographical data of a peer that the 
subjects might likely encounter at their university. The 
exotic date was described using traits and biographical data 
of a person whom the subjects likely had not met, e.g., a 
transfer student from a large east coast city, with unstable 
academic performance, and liberal attitudes toward drugs, 
alcohol, and sex. Subjects were then asked to express their 
expectations toward enjoying the date. Based on the 
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discussion on uncertainty and risk it would be expected that 
the exotic date would be seen as more variable in outcome 
than mundane dates. This was in fact what was found. The 
rating scores of male and female subjects who were asked to 
rate each of the two types of dates demonstrated greater 
within subject variability on ratings of the unfamiliar 
date. It was also found that females (but not males) tended 
to evaluate the mundane date more favorably than males. 
This preference was clear despite the fact that the average 
rating of the separate characteristics in isolation did not 
differentiate between mundane and exotic dates for either 
males or females. 
In a second study (Phillips and Parra, in preparation) 
both males and females were presented with a hypothetical 
date which was described using 13 different date 
characteristics, i.e., events that might occur on the date 
with their particular partner. Each of the 13 events 
differed on the extent which they were "good or bad events" 
(a pilot study determined the degree to which each of the 
events was preceived as good or bad), and they differed on 
how likely they were to happen on the date. The dates were 
divided into two groups on the variability of these events. 
Subjects were asked to carefully read the date 
characteristics, form an opinion of the potential partner, 
and evaluate him/her. The date partner which was presented 
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with the greater variability of date characteristics was 
rated lower by females. Females also felt they were less 
likely to experience a "successful date" with the date 
possessing greater variability. Thus, females demonstrated 
risk aversion in both studies, while males failed to 
demonstrate either risk seeking or risk aversion. 
At this point an examination of hypothetical preference 
score curves will further emphasize the role of risk, and 
need to account for it, in the dating situation. Figure 5 
represents hypothetical preference scores derived from the 
Portfolio theory formula. It similarly represents 
preference scores across increasing levels of attractiveness 
(8 levels) and different levels of probability of gain (10 
levels). However, these curves have been attained with T 
equal to 1.00, which in turn leads to a zero value for the 
risk component. As can be seen Figure 5 reasonably 
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approximates the data generated by Shanteau and Nagy (1979) 
that was presented in Figure 4, lending weight to the notion 
that risk was not considered by subjects in the Shanteau and 
Nagy (1979) study. Their study represents a simple version 
of the Portfolio theory formula: the rational model, where 
T is equal to 1.00. That their findings can be accounted 
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for by the Portfolio theory formula provides additional 
evidence of the ability of the formula to conceptualize data 
in the area of interpersonal decision making in uncertainty. 
The formula derived from Portfolio theory may also be 
used to demonstrate the discounting effect of risk in low 
probability of acceptance situations. Figure 6 illustrates 
hypothetical preference scores where T = .862. These 
hypothetical SEU's depict preference as if subjects were 
considering the element of risk. The preference curves each 
represent a different level of probability of acceptance. 
It can be seen that at higher levels of acceptance 
preference is relatively monotonic with attractiveness. 
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However, at increasingly lower levels of acceptance, 
preference becomes increasingly non-monotonic with 
attractiveness. At the lowest levels of acceptance 
preference increases from low to moderate attractiveness and 
then tends to decrease in the high attractiveness condition. 
Support for this lack of monotonicity can be found in a 
study by Sigall and Aronson (1969). These researchers found 
that attractive females who evaluated male subjects 
positively were liked most, while attractive females who 
presented a negative evaluation towards subjects were liked 
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least. Falling between these two extremes, liking was 
greater for the unattractive-positive evaluator than for the 
unattractive-negative evaluator and, interestingly, the 
attractive-negative evaluator. 
Intuitively, positive and negative evaluation can be 
viewed as cues to level of approval or acceptance. That is, 
if one individual rates another positively, that first 
individual is expressing some degree of acceptance of the 
second. To the extent that a person is rated positively or 
negatively by another, that person can be said to be 
accepted or not accepted by the other. Therefore, it may be 
that the highly attractive individual would be liked less 
than the unattractive individual when both are expressing a 
low level of acceptance. This is consistent with the 
non-monotonic effects of attractiveness on SEU at low levels 
of probability of acceptance as predicted by Portfolio 
theory and as illustrated in Figure 6. 
Utilizing the formula from Portfolio theory we would 
expect that as probability of acceptance approached zero SEU 
would decrease, which is in fact what Shanteau and Nagy 
(1979) found. However, there is something further we might 
expect. Given that summing the probabilities of the date 
situation must result in a value of 1.00, if probability of 
acceptance is low, then probability of non-acceptance is 
high. Utilizing the Portfolio theory formula, at low levels 
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of acceptance as physical attractiveness (SUg) increases 
from moderate to high, SEU should decrease. This would also 
provide an alternative explanation of why Sigall and Aronson 
(1969) found that the high attractive-negative evaluators 
were more derogated than the moderate or 
unattractive-negative evaluators. 
Yet, this phenomenon did not occur in Shanteau and 
Nagy's (1979) study. That no such effect was obtained by 
Shanteau and Nagy may have resulted from the lack of mundane 
realism in their study. That is, subjects did not expect to 
actually date the person rated. Clearly, their subjects 
knew they were not participating in an actual dating 
situation. Since there was nothing at stake there was 
nothing to gain or lose. Under these condition it is 
unlikely that the element of risk would have been a factor. 
The similarity between Figure 4 and the zero-risk curves 
shown in Figure supports 5 this possibility. 
In Figure 6 the effect of risk can be noted in the 
concavity of the curves in all but the "sure thing"-high 
probability of acceptance date partner. Experimental 
subjects that produced preference data similar to that in 
Figure 6 could be labled risk averse in their approach 
towards potential partners. If there were a sex difference 
in this area with females tending toward risk averse 
behavior and males not demonstrating either risk seeking or 
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averse behavior, we would expect female data to more closely 
approximate Figure 6 and male data to approximate Figure 5. 
The purpose of the present study is to examine in a 
more realistic situation than in pr evious studies 1) whether 
there is any difference between men and women in risk 
aversion or seeking behavior in the dating situation; 2) if 
increasing the value of a date (through increased realism 
and monetary gain), will lead to the lower rating of 
attractive dates in the low probability of acceptance 
condition as predicted by the Portfolio theory formula; and 
3) whether such factors as the subject's physical 
attractiveness, individual differences in the propensity to 
take risks, and self-esteem play a role in mediating these 
effects. 
Method 
Subjects. 154 male and female undergraduates from 
introductory psychology classes at Oklahoma State University 
were administered a screening questionnaire and received 
extra-credit for their participation. This questionnaire 
was used to identify those students who would be eligible to 
participate in the full study. Eligibility requirements 
were that the subjects be unmarried and that they considered 
themselves "eligible to date others" (see Appendix A for the 
screening questionnaire). Of those that qualified, 30 males 
and 30 females agreed to participate. These subjects were 
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paid an amount from $3 to $13 for their participation. All 
subjects were run individually. 
Materials. A set of three files each containing a 
photograph of a person of the opposite sex and a 
corresponding probability of acceptance phrase was used as 
stimulus materials. The stimulus photographs were obtained 
in a preliminary study. The stimulus persons were volunteer 
undergraduates who were fully informed of the use of their 
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photos prior to their photo being taken and who had agreed 
in writing to the use of these photographs. The photographs 
were rated on level of attractiveness by additional 
volunteer undergraduates on a one to ten scale. Male 
subjects rated the female photos and female subjects rated 
the male photos. Eight photographs of each sex were 
selected from a larger set originally taken. An ANOVA and a 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Newman-Keuls test were performed on the photo ratings to 
determine High, Moderate, and Low levels of attractiveness. 
Tables 1 and 2 contain the ANOVA summary tables and mean 
rating scores of all stimulus photos by male and female 
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subjects, respectively. Among the photos rated by females, 
all photos except the two with the lowest rating were 
significantly different from each other. Among those rated 
by males, three were found to be clearly significantly 
different from each other. The total set of six photos 
chosen for the present study were comparable in terms of 
attractiveness level across sex and were equally spaced 
within each sex. 
Procedure. Initial recruitment was performed in the 
introductory psychology classes. All interested students 
were informed to show up for a screening session. At this 
session they received 1 point extra-credit and were asked to 
complete the screening questionnaire. Among many other 
questions the questionnaire elicited information on their 
eligibility, e.g., non-married, not steadily dating any one 
person, and/or free to date another person. The 
questionnaire also obtained names and phone numbers to later 
contact those who qualified to participate in the full 
study. The eligibles were contacted by telephone and 
informed that they had the opportunity of participating in a 
study in which they would be paid from $3 to $13. They were 
further informed that they had qualified by virtue of'their 
marital and dating status and that it was their "attitudes 
about dating" on which the current study was centered. The 
60 subjects who qualified and agreed to participate were 
instructed when and where to arrive for the study. 
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The entire study was conducted over one 5-day period 
(Thursday - Monday) to minimize leakage of information. 
Each subject was brought from a waiting room by a research 
assistant to the experimental room and was seated at a 
table. At certain points throughout the study, each subject 
was exposed to fictitious information so as to increase the 
realism of the situation. For example, subjects were told 
that a total of 6 subjects, including themselves, would be 
necessary to perform the study, and that it had been 
difficult to have all people show up on schedule, and at 
times people missed their session and needed to be 
rescheduled. 
A description of the "typical" dating situation and the 
current study was given to each subject. This description 
included a statement that only those subjects who pick the 
potential date partner who also picks them will receive $13 
to spend on the date (see appendix B for the description). 
The subject then signed a consent form giving his/her 
permission to be photographed. All subjects were informed 
that they would later have the opportunity to keep their 
photo if they so desired. The photo of the subject was 
taken in the same office location and with the same type of 
camera (Poloroid Sun 6000) as were the photos of the 
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potential dates; this additionally served to increase the 
realism of the study. 
Following a brief period a second research assistant 
entered the room, was introduced by the first assistant, and 
stated that all other individuals were present and that the 
study could continue. The second assistant then took the 
subject to another room. In this room the subject was given 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) to 
complete and was told his/her photo was to be "taken to the 
next part of the study". The Self-Esteem Scale was titled 
"Background Information Form" and the subject was told its 
completion was needed to supply some additional information. 
Approximately 10 minutes later the second assistant 
returned with three files. Each file contained a potential 
date's photograph (stimulus photo) and a form presumably 
completed by the pictured stimulus person. This form 
contained a) a hypothetical statement which was presumably 
provided for the potential date to read, and b) the 
probability of acceptance phrases. The following nine 
phrases were on the form: Definitely, Almost a sure thing, 
Very likely, Fairly likely, Toss up, Somewhat unlikely, ·Very 
unlikely, Little or no chance, and Definitely not. Each of 
the three files had one of these phrases, Fairly Likely, 
Somewhat Unlikely, and Little or No Chance, checked. 
Previously, (Lichtenstein & Newman, 1976) these three 
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phrases were found to be associated with the probabilities 
.66, .31, and .16, respectively. The hypothetical statement 
acknowledged the fact that a decision to date another person 
typically involves many other factors besides physical 
appearance. It also asked the potential date to decide on a 
date in this situation "based only on how this person (the 
subject) appears in this photo". The self-esteem material 
was collected and the subject was shown the files and photos 
and asked if any of the potential dates were known to 
him/her. No subject admitted to knowing any of the stimulus 
persons. 
The subject was then instructed to carefully review all 
photos and probability of acceptance phrases and rank order 
the three potential dates. This ranking task was introduced 
as something which would aid the subject in his/her final 
decision. Next, the subject rated each of the potential 
dates on a single numerical rating scale (1 to 10) and on a 
series of Semantic Differential scales. The Semantic 
Differential elicited ratings across Good/Bad and 
Valuable/Worthless dimensions, and across Risky/Not Risky 
and Dangerous/Safe dimensions. Other scales utilitilized as 
fillers included: Weak/Strong, Slow/Fast, Active/Passive, 
Powerful/Powerless. 
The subject was then asked to choose the individual 
with whom he/she would most-like, and second-most-like, the 
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opportunity to date. In several instances (6 females and 3 
males), the subject did not wish to indicate a desired date. 
In those cases the subject was asked to choose 
hypothetically. 
The subject was then taken to another room and 
debriefed. This debriefing informed the subject that 
although there would not in fact be any date, he/she would 
still receive from $3 to $13 as promised by way of a 
procedure detailed below. A note should be made with regard 
to information gathered verbally during the debriefing 
situation. It appeared that for very nearly all subjects 
the experimental procedure was perceived as extrememly 
realistic. A great majority of subjects either stated 
verbally or displayed through non-verbal behavior that they 
were suprised upon finding that there were not other 
potential dates actually present and that there was not 
going to be any opportunity for an actual date experience. 
Following the debriefing the subject was taken to a 
final room containing a micro-computer. The instructions 
for the payment procedure were explained and subjects once 
again were asked to give written consent. Each subject was 
informed that this final part of the study involved a random 
number generator. The subject was asked to choose three of 
10 numbers (0 to 9) printed on a form. These three numbers 
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were to be those which the subject believed would also be 
generated by the random-number computer program. 
This task had two possible outcomes. These outcomes 
were receiving $13, or receiving $3, with a "somewhat 
unlikely chance" that the subject would receive the $13. 
The subjects was told that if the computer output at least 2 
of their 3 numbers they would receive $13, and if the 
computer output less than 2 of their 3, they receive $3 for 
their participation. 
The subject was then additionally informed that as an 
additional option the number-choosing opportunity could be 
sold back to the experimenter. The conditions were, 
however, that their could be only one "sales bid" and if the 
subject asked for an amount greater than a certain 
predetermined amount (the expected value, EV = $4.97, of the 
task) he/she could not sell and must then participate in the 
number-choosing task. An additional informed consent form 
was signed indicating an understanding of this additional 
opportunity. The subject then wrote down on the second 
consent form the amount, in dollars and cents, that he/she 
would be willing to accept in lieu of the chance to win 
either $3 or $13. The size of the subject's bid was used in 
the analysis as a measure of the subject's riskiness (see 
Appendix C for all consent forms). 
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Following the subject's bid the subject was informed if 
that price was acceptable. However, the critical amount, 
EV, remained known only by the experimenter. If the 
subject's bid was below the EV he/she received that amount 
in cash. If the amount was above the EV he/she needed to 
participate in the choosing of numbers. Following the sale 
or actual choosing of numbers, all subjects received their 
payment. The subject was given back his/her photo, then 
asked if they would return it for its use in similar future 
research studies. All but three subjects (one male and two 
females) returned their photo. 
A follow-up study was performed utilizing those photos 
that subjects chose not to keep. These photos were rated by 
additional subjects in the same manner that the stimulus 
photos were rated. This allowed for the analysis of the 
subject's physical attractiveness as a co-variate along with 
self-esteem. It also provided a check within the study for 
the Goffman's (1952) "matching-hypothesis". 
Design. The present design is a 3 x 3 x 2 factorial 
experiment. There are two within subject variables 
(Physical Attractiveness and Probability of Acceptance), 
each having three levels, and one between-subjects variable 
(Sex), having two levels. Because of the nature of the 
study it was impractical to expose each subject to all 
possible combinations of the within-subject variables. 
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Therefore, the analysis was performed by creating balanced 
incomplete replications, where each subject is designated as 
a block, assigning three treatment combinations to a block, 
and confounding the interaction between the two 
within-subject variables across the two replications. 
With three levels of Physical Attractiveness, three 
levels of Probability of Acceptance, and two levels of Sex, 
there were 18 different treatment combinations. Each 
subject received three photos differing in attractiveness 
level, and three probability of acceptance phrases, each 
differing in level of acceptance. The 
photo/acceptance-phrase combination was different between 
all subjects in a single group, and within each group all 
possible combinations of the three levels of Physical 
Attraction and the three levels of Probability of Acceptance 
were administered. Five complete groups, 12 subjects in a 
group, were planned. Since each subject, male and female, 
was to receive three different treatment combinations, the 
total 60 subjects would have combined to produce 10 scores 
for each treatment combination. Unfortunately, two males 
and two females were accidently exposed to the incorrect 
experimental conditions. However, this resulted in only a 
difference between groups of 2 observations (two 
experimental groups had 9 observations and two experimental 
groups had 11 observations). Those groups composed of other 
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than 10 observations are noted accordingly within the tables 
of means. 
A manipulation check was performed in order to verify 
the validity of the "risk" to which subjects were exposed. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
A variable was created, Risk, by averaging each subject's 
scores across Risky/Not Risky and Dangerous/Safe dimensions 
of the semantic differential task described earlier. The 
means for the Risk variable from male and female subjects 
are given in Table 3. Table 4 supplies the summary table 
for the analysis of variance with Risk as the dependent 
variable. As can be seen in Table 4, the main effects were 
found significant, Photo Attractiveness, f(2, 104) = 
Insert Table 4 about here 
14.12, £<.01, and Probability of Acceptance, f(2, 104) = 
9.83, £<.01. Neither the effect for Sex nor any of the 
interaction components were found significant. Physical 
Attractiveness supports Portfolio theory predictions, 
whereas Probability of Acceptance does not. The 
relationship between mean scores for male and female 
subjects on the Risk variable is shown in Figure 7. For 
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both male and female subjects, lower levels of Probability 
of Acceptance resulted in the potential date being perceived 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
as more risky, and female subjects tended to view higher 
levels of Attractiveness as more risky (see Figure 7). A 
Insert Table 5 about here 
simple main effects test was then performed on the Risk 
scores for all subjects. The ANOVA summary table for this 
test is given in Table 5. 
As detailed earlier, the outcome probability 
distribution of a gamble (assuming G ~ 0, and L ~ 0) has a 
variance which can be computed by VAR(X) = P(l-P) (G-L) 2 , and 
this variability represents the level of uncertainty or risk 
of the gamble. The first component of the variability 
involves the combined probabilities of the outcomes. 
Decreasing the differences between outcome probabilities 
leads to increased variability. The quantity P(l-P), where 
1 > P > 0, has its maximum value at P = (1-P) = .5, (a wager 
with two equally likely outcomes is intuitively more 
uncertain or riskier than one in which the probability of 
one outcome is closer to 1). For example, an alternative 
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with 90% chance of gain and 10% chance of loss is less risky 
than an alternative with a 50% chance of gain and loss, and 
an alternative with a 90% chance of loss and a 10% chance of 
gain is less risky than an alternative with a 50% chance of 
gain and loss. 
The second component of the variance of the probability 
distribution involves the potential gains and losses. 
Variability (or risk) is increased by increasing either 
potential gain or potential loss. Since the potential gain 
(G) is conceptualized as a non-negative number, and the 
potential loss (L) is a non-positive number, variability 
increases as the square of the sum of the absolute value of 
each of these quantities. With respect to a decision in the 
dating paradigm, with a given value of physical 
attractiveness (G) , and a given value of probability of 
acceptance (P) , we are able to compute the variance of each 
date alternative. 
In the present study the probability values being 
associated with high, moderate, and low Probability of 
Acceptance are .66, .31. and .16 (Lichtenstein & Newman, 
1976). If these were in fact the values that the subjects 
understood, and if the subjects conceptualized the word 
"Risk" as has been done in prior research (Coombs & Bowen, 
1971; Coombs & Huang, 1976), the following would be 
expected: the greatest perceived risk at high Probability 
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of Acceptance (I .66-.51 = .16), a lower perceived risk at 
moderate Probability of Acceptance (I .31-.51 = .19), and the 
least perceived risk at low Probability of Acceptance 
(1.16-.51 = .34). 
However, the Risk scores from male subjects are in the 
exact opposite direction than predicted by Portfolio theory 
in the low and medium Attractiveness condition. For males 
in the high attractiveness condition and for all females, 
risk scores are not differentiated where Portfolio theory 
predicts they should. Correlations were performed between 
subject's risk score and risk as predicted by the Portfolio 
theory formula. For males it was -.029, and for females it 
was .53. These correlation coefficients can be viewed as a 
measure of construct validity. Thus, it appears this is a 
better measure of risk for females than for males. 
This presents a potential problem for interpretation of 
the "risk" presented to subjects as Portfolio theory 
warrants. It appears that subjects assess risk more in line 
with intuition than with the Portfolio theory prescription. 
However, there are two explanations that may provide 
allowance for the present method of presenting risk. 
The first is straightforward. It may be that the 
subjects did not label risk in the same manner in which it 
is labled by Portfolio theory. Thus, there would exist 
Risk1 and Risk2, and they would not be equivalent. 
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The second is more complicated, yet it is supported by 
findings in another area. It is here suggested that the 
subjects have systematically distorted the Probability of 
Acceptance values upward due to the unrealistic optimism 
(Weinstein, 1980; Parra & Phillips, 1984) and/or illusion of 
control (Langer, 1975) phenomena. If subjects were doing 
this, by perhaps adding .3 to each of the Lichtenstein and 
Newman (1976) Probability values, these "distorted" 
subjective pobabilities would then be .96, .61, and .46 
rather than .66, .31, and .16. This would have a 
significant effect on the Portfolio theory measure of risk. 
The differences between the new subjective probabilties and 
.5 would be exactly reversed from the Lichtenstein and 
Newman (1976) values. 
The variability, or risk estimate, was calculated with 
the Portfolio theory formula using the new probability 
values. The correlation between the adjusted theoretical 
risk and subject's rated risk were .59 for males and .72 for 
females. While it is not known exactly to what degree 
subjects might be distorting the probability values, it is 
clear that any actual upward distortion in the subjective 
probability of acceptance would serve to lower the observed 
correlation between the original theoretical risk estimates 
and the subject's ratings of risk. Thus, the lower 
correlation between theoretical risk and rated risk may be 
due to a difference in risk assessment, but also to an 
optimistic bias on the part of the subjects. 
Results 
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De~ndent_ Variables. The overall rating of the 
potential date partner performed by each subject on the 1 to 
10 rating scale was labled "Rating". The scores from the 
Semantic Differential dimensions Good/Bad and 
Valuable/Worthless were averaged together to form one 
variable, "Evaluation". "Choice" scores indicate how the 
subject actually chose his/her potential date partner. A 
score of 1, 2, and 3 indicate first, second, and third 
choice. Results pertinent to each of these dependent 
variables are presented below. 
Rating. The summary table for the analysis of variance 
with the Rating score as the dependent variable is shown in 
Table 6. As can be seen in Table 6, the main 
--- --·- --· -- -·- ----- ---
Insert Table 6 about here 
effects for both Photo Attractiveness, f(2, 104) = 26.82, 
£<.01, and Probability of Acceptance, f(2, 104) = 15.99, 
£<.01, were statistically significant. Also significant was 
the Sex by Photo Attractiveness interaction, f(2, 104) = 
4.17, £<.05 (see Table 6). A simple main effects test was 
performed on Photo Attractiveness and found Sex significant 
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at high Photo Attractiveness, f(l, 59) = 44.55, E<.Ol, and 
insignificant at moderate and low Photo Attractiveness. The 
Photo Attractiveness by Probability of Acceptance 
interaction was not found significant. There was no 
significant effect for Sex. 
The mean Rating scores from both male and female 
subjects are presented in Figure 8 and in Tables 7 and 8. 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
Rating scores from female subjects were monotonic with Photo 
Attractiveness in the high level of acceptance condition. 
However, in both the moderate and low Probability of 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Acceptance conditions, Rating scores were non-monotonic with 
Attractiveness. Male subjects did not demonstrate this 
trend in their Rating scores, which were generally monotonic 
with Photo Attractiveness. 
In order to evaluate this non-montonic effect a 
standard trend analysis was performed on the means for the 
Rating variable. For male subjects, there was no 
significant departure from linearity for any of the 
Probability of Acceptance conditions. On the other hand, 
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Insert Table 8 about here 
the Rating means for female subjects in both the medium and 
low Probability of Acceptance conditions showed a 
significant non-linear trend, f(1, 104) = 4.37 £<.05, and 
f(1, 104) = 6.91, £<.01, respectively (see Figure 8). There 
was no significant departure from linearity in the high 
Probability of Acceptance condition for females. 
Evaluation. The results for the dependent variable 
Evaluation were very similar to those for Rating. The 
summary table for the analysis of variance with Evaluation 
as the dependent variable is supplied in Table 9. As shown 
in Table 9, the main effects for Photo Attractiveness, f(2, 
104) = 21.81, £<.01, and Probability of Acceptance, 
Insert Table 9 about here 
K(2, 104) = 25.19, £<.01, were statistically significant, as 
was the Sex by Probability of Acceptance interaction, f(2, 
104) = 5.79, £<.01. A simple main effects test found Sex 
significant at high Probability of Acceptance, K(1, 59) = 
19.22, £<.01. The Photo Attractiveness by Probability of 
Acceptance interaction was not significant, and there was no 
significant effect for Sex. The mean scores for Evaluation 
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from male and female subjects are found in Tables 7 and 8, 
respectively (see Tables 7 & 8). 
The relationship between the mean Evaluation scores, 
Photo Attractiveness, and Probability of Acceptance can be 
seen in Figure 9. As with Rating, the male subject's 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
Evaluation scores were generally monotonic with Photo 
Attractiveness, and female Evaluation scores were mononotic 
with Photo Attractiveness in the high Probability of 
Acceptance condition and were non-monotonic for the moderate 
and low Probability of Acceptance conditions. 
A trend analysis was also performed on the means for 
Evaluation. The high Probability of Acceptance condition 
for male subjects was significantly non-linear, f(1, 104) = 
4.43, £<.05. The Evaluation score curve for female subjects 
in the medium Probability of Acceptance condition was found 
marginally significantly non-linear, F(1, 104) = 3.38 £<.10. 
These tests for non-linearity were less than optimally 
powerful as they did not allow credit for the fact that the 
specific monotonicity which was found for female subjects 
was predicted in advance. That is, the null hypothesis of 
non-linear trend using this analysis would have been 
rejected had the non-monotonic effect been in the opposite 
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direction. Since not only was non-monotonicity predicted, 
but also the specific direction of the non-monotonicity, the 
null hypothesis was contrasted with a directional 
alternative hypothesis using as critical values of F, values 
significant at 2(p). Using the directional hypothesis F 
values on the female Evaluation score curves, the medium 
Probability of Acceptance condition showed significant 
non-linearity, f(1, 104) = 3.38 £<.05, and the low 
Probability of Acceptance condition showed a marginally 
significant non-linear effect, f(1, 104) = 2.39, £<.10. 
Choice. The summary table for the analysis of variance 
with Choice as the dependent variable is shown in Table 10. 
The between subjects variance components were not 
Insert Table 10 about here 
presented since the sum of the Choice variable score (1, 2, 
or 3, exclusively) was exactly 6 for each subject, and this 
eliminated the possibility of between subjects effects. 
Photo Attractiveness and Probability of Acceptance were both 
highly significant, f(2, 104) = 35.43, £<.01 and f(2, 104) = 
9.19, £<.01. However, none of the interaction components 
were found significant (see Table 9). The analysis of 
variance for Choice failed to find a signficant effect for 
Sex. 
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The mean scores for Choice from male and female 
subjects are listed in Tables 7 and 8. The relationship 
between mean scores for male and female subjects on the 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
Choice variable are shown in Figure 10. Unlike the Rating 
and Evaluation data, Choice scores produced data curves 
which were linear in all conditions; the standard and 
directional trend analyses failed to find any significant 
non-linearity in these means (see Figure 10). In order to 
provide comparability between the present study and prior 
studies, correlations were computed between Photo 
Attractiveness and Choice and between Probability of 
Acceptance and Choice. These correlation coefficients 
ranged from .51 to .78. The complete correlation matrix is 
provided in Table 11. 
Additional Correlational Data. Correlations performed 
between certain pairs of variables computed with the overall 
data are shown in Table 12. Table 13 contains 
Insert Table 12 about here 
correlation matrices for these same variables computed from 
both male and female data. Significant correlations 
included: Dollar Bid given by each subject and Subject 
Number (how early each subject was run) -.28; Bid and 
---~~----~-----
Insert Table 13 about here 
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Self-Esteem, .37 females, -.07 males (not significant). Not 
significant were Self-Esteem and subject's own 
attractiveness, -.27 males, .14 females (see Tables 10, 11, 
& 12). Another variable, AC (Attractive Choice), was 
created by assigning a 3, 2, or 1, to each subject depending 
on whether he/she picked as preferred date the high, 
moderate, or low attractive potential date regardless of 
level of acceptance. The correlation between AC and 
Self-Esteem was 0.04 for males, and -.12 for females. The 
correlation between AC and Subject's own attractiveness was 
0.25 for males, and -0.29 for females. The correlation 
between Choice of date and Photo Attractiveness was .58 
overall, .63 for males, and .53 for females. The 
correlation between Choice of date and Probability of 
Acceptance was .31 overall, 38 for males, and .23 for 
females. 
It was speculated that Subject Attractiveness, 
Self-Esteem, and Dollar Bid (risk estimate), might have 
influenced the subject's Rating, Evaluation, and Choice 
scores. A regression analysis was performed using the 
62 
Subject's Attractiveness, Self-Esteem, and Dollar Bid in the 
regression quantity for estimating Rating, Evaluation, and 
Choice. It was found from this regression analysis that the 
effect of each of these covariates did not appear to be 
consistent from cell to cell. That is, there appeared to be 
interactions between the covariates and the dependent 
variables. From Goffman's (1952) "Matching Hypothesis" we 
might expect such a finding. We might also expect that 
Rating and/or Evaluation of a potential partner might vary 
with the individual's own level of attractiveness, and 
self-esteem. Therefore, in an attempt to create a 
conservative analysis (allowing the effect of these 
potential influences to be as large as possible), a separate 
slopes model of ANCOVA was performed on the Rating, 
Evaluation, and Choice variables. 
The analyses of covariance showed a marked reduction in 
the effects of both Photo Attractiveness and Probability of 
Acceptance on each of the dependent variables. However, the 
results of the trend analyses of the means after adjustment 
for all covariates were essentially the same as the results 
of the trend analyses on the unadjusted means that have 
already been reported. A more complete review of the 
analyses of covariance including tables and figures is 
presented in Appendix D. 
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Discussion 
The major hypothesis of this study was that, in a 
social dating situation, females (but not males) would 
demonstrate risk aversion. This risk aversion effect was 
expected ~o manifest itself in a preference for a potential 
date that was non-monotonic as a function of physical 
attractiveness for low probability of acceptance, but which 
was a monotonic function of physical attractiveness for high 
probability of acceptance. 
Figures 8 and 9, supported by the tests for trend, 
provide very substantial support for this hypothesis. The 
results were stronger for the Rating dependent variable than 
for the Evaluation dependent variable, but the effect is 
clear in both cases. 
The data curves for the Rating and Evaluation variables 
among male subjects (see Figures 8 & 9) closely approximate 
the mean preference responses produced by subjects in the 
Shanteau and Nagy (1979) study (see Figure 4). It was 
described in the introduction that Shanteau and Nagy's 
subjects had performed as if they had not considered the 
concept of risk. The fact that the present male data 
resembles both the Shanteau and Nagy (1979) data and the 
hypothetical data calculated without the risk component 
shown in Figure 5 strongly suggests that the male subjects 
in the present study also acted without regard to risk. 
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Furthermore, the data curves for Rating and Evaluation from 
female subjects (see Figures 8 & 9) resemble those in Figure 
6 (hypothetical preference scores calculated by the 
Portfolio theory formula with T = .862 illustrating 
preference as if subjects were considering the element of 
risk) • The Evaluation scores from females show an effect 
for Probability of Acceptance only in the high 
Attractiveness condition (the non-monotonic trend predicted 
by the Portfolio theory formula) • The significant trend for 
the male Evaluation score in the high Probability of 
Acceptance condition was not considered "non-monotonic" in 
the same sense as the significant trends for females. Upon 
inspection of Figure 9 it becomes apparent that these scores 
represent an increase and "leveling off", rather than an 
increase followed by a decrease as displayed by female 
subjects. 
Upon inspection of mean Rating scores (see Figure 8), 
the significant Sex by Photo Attractiveness interaction 
seems to be a function of the risk aversion phenomenon 
demonstrated by females. Male subjects, apparently not 
responding to risk ·in their Rating scores, have higher 
scores, particularly in the high attractiveness condition. 
The simple main effects test on the Sex by Photo 
Attractiveness interaction indicate that males display 
significantly higher ratings than females in the high Photo 
65 
Attractiveness condition; whereas in the low and moderate 
conditions, there were no differences between males and 
females. Similarly, the simple main effects test on the Sex 
by Probability of Acceptance interaction for Evaluation 
indicates males gave higher evaluations than females in the 
high Probability of Acceptance condition, but there were no 
Sex differences in the moderate and low Probability of 
acceptance conditions. 
Although the female Rating and Evaluation data indicate 
a risk factor is involved (risk aversion) they are not 
entirely consistent with the data found by Sigall and 
Aronson (1969) who found the low Probability of Acceptance, 
high Attractive date rated lower than the low Probability of 
Acceptance, low Attractive date. This particular data 
configuration had also been predicted by the Portfolio 
theory formula. Perhaps the realism of this study involving 
potential dates, rather than a "tester" as in Sigall & 
Aronson (1969), resulted in generally more moderate ratings. 
An individual who represents both a peer and a potential 
date might likely be less derogated than would an individual 
in a superior position who is administering a test. 
The non-monotonic effect was not found among the scores 
for Choice for either sex. When faced with the task of 
actually choosing, i.e., performing the behavior which will 
directly affect whether or not a date will result, both 
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males and females ignore any perceived risk factor and act 
strictly in accordance with physical attractiveness and 
probability of acceptance. As with Rating and Evaluation, 
the subject's Choice scores are strongly affected by 
Probability of Acceptance and, to a much greater extent, 
Photo Attractiveness. There are no other factors which 
contribute significantly to the actual choice of the date 
partner. 
Similar data has been found (Shanteau & Nagy, 1979), 
albeit in a much less realistic situation. Nevertheless, in 
this study Attractiveness is clearly the predominant factor 
in actual date choice. High attractive dates of all levels 
of acceptance were chosen more often as desired dates than 
even the high-accepting, low-attractive dates. Choice of 
partner determines if, and with whom, the individual will 
date. While Rating and Evaluation could be labeled 
assessment or opinion, Choice is the consequence relevant 
judgement. 
One can only speculate as to why females in this study 
chose the date partner which they had rated so poorly. This 
is with reference primarily to the high attractive, low 
accepting date. It may be that when performing the task 
that is consequence relevant the influence of physical 
attractiveness outweighs the negative aspect of 
non-acceptance. The female subjects may have believed, by 
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virtue of unrealistic optimism or illusion of control that 
they could overcome, or change, the acceptance level of the 
male date and ultimately experience acceptance. 
Although subjects were strongly influenced in their 
preference (Rating, Evaluation, and Choice) for potential 
dates by the physical attractiveness of the potential dates 
and the stated probability of acceptance, there were no 
significant Photo Attractiveness by Probability of 
Acceptance interactions. Figure 5 displays the set of 
scores predicted by the Portfolio theory formula where an 
interaction clearly is present. In the present study 
practical considerations (number of subjects required) 
limited the number of experimental conditions. Thus, the 
range of Probability was restricted to only that which was 
necessary to demonstrate the non-montonic trend. This 
restricted range of Probability did not allow for an 
interaction with Photo Attractiveness. 
Self-Esteem, as it was measured in this study, did not 
effect the ratings given to potential dates regardless of 
the potential date's physical attractiveness. However, it 
may be that the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale is lacking in 
the sensitivity to detect a degree of Esteem, or lack of, 
for differentiation of different groups, and show an effect 
in the data. Or, perhaps since subjects were informed 
before agreeing to participate that the study was to be 
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focused on their "dating responses and attitudes", only 
those higher in Esteem volunteered and/or actually showed up 
to participate. Somewhat consistent with this finding, 
though inconsistent with the Matching Hypothesis (Goffman, 
1952), is that the correlations between subject's 
attractiveness and the choice of an attractive date were 
insignificant for both males and females. Thus, the 
subjects in this study were not differentiated by degree of 
self-esteem in their rating or choice and chose their date 
partners according to probability of acceptance and, more 
significantly, physical attractiveness. 
The -.28 correlation between Dollar Bid and Subject 
number reveals the possibility exists of a "leak" of 
information. That is, subjects tended to ask for a lower 
amount of money to sell their opportunity to choose numbers. 
It may have been that as subjects heard from friends having 
already participated that prior bids had been "too high" 
they adjusted their own bids accordingly. It was 
interesting to note the opposite pattern among certain 
correlations between the sexes. It appears males higher in 
physical attractiveness scored higher in self-esteem and 
chose date partners which were higher in physical 
attractiveness, while who were females higher in physical 
attractiveness scored lower in self-esteem and chose date 
partners who were lower in physical attractiveness. 
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All three "evaluatory" variables (Rating, Evaluation, 
and Choice) provide added evidence to the already existing 
large body of data for the importance of physical 
attractiveness in the dating situation (see Berschied & 
Walster, 1974 for a review). That Probability of Acceptance 
is proven here to be an important factor in the general 
desirability of a potential date partner is also consistent 
with prior research in this area (Walster, Aronson, 
Abrahams, & Rottmann, 1966; Tesser & Brodie, 1971; Shanteau 
& Nagy, 1979). As Huston (1973) found, subjects tend to 
give higher ratings and choose more often those potential 
dates who display a higher liklihood of acceptance. 
Future research stemming from this study should focus 
more clearly on understanding the reasons, particularly with 
reference to females, for the difference between the 
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1As Eagly and Chaiken (1984) have noted, the expectancy 
X value concept has been employed widely in psychological 
theorizing. It has figured in various theories of 
motivation (e.g., Atkinson, 1958; Lewin, 1938; Tolman, 1958) 
as well as in Rotter's (1954) social learning theory. It 
has been employed in a variety of conceptions of attitudes 
and attitude change (e.g., Peak, 1955) and forms the basis 






INITIAL SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please complete the following questionnaire. All 
information is confidential. 
Sex Age Major in college -----
Year in college Resident of Oklahoma ---
What year do you plan to graduate -----
Are you currently married? ----
If not, at what age do you plan to marry? ___ ·-·----
Would being in debt worry you? ----
Are you currently dating? -----
If not, have you ~ec~ntly separated from an ongoing 
relationship? __ 
If recently separated, how long had you been dating this 
person? -------
81 
Also, if recently separated, use the space below to indicate 
your current feelings regarding this separation (e.g., 
positive or negative feelings, attitudes towards other 
potential dates). 
82 
Upon marrying, how many children do you plan to have? ___ _ 
Would you say that your feelings are easily hurt? -----
Were your biological parents divorced? ____ _ 
About how old would you like to be when you marry? -----
How many children are there in your family? ______ _ 
Which position among your brothers and sisters are you 
(oldest, youngest, middle, etc.)? ________ __ 
Do you have "many" or "few" hobbies? ____ _ 
Whether you are currently dating someone or not, do you 
consider yourself eligible to date others? -----
Are you the type of person who likes to tell a good story or 
listen to a good story? _________ _ 
How many "close" friends would you say you have? _______ _ 
Compared with your peers at o.s.u., how likely are you to 
have a happy and secure marriage? 
Please use the scale below: 
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9----10 
Less likely Just as likely More likely 
Do you (or did you) get along better with your mother or 
your father? ___ _ 
Would you dodge paying taxes if you were sure you would 
never be found out? -------
Name 
You may be contacted by phone for the next part of the 
study. 
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Please indicate those places and phone numbers which during 
the week and weekends you can be reached (for example home, 
work, dorm, etc.) and the times which you could be best 
reached (day of week and hours of the day) in the space 
below. Thank you for your participation. 
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APPENDIX B 
DESCRIPTION OF TYPICAL DATING SITUATION 
85 
"Usually when two people are in a pre-dating situation, 
one person plays the role of the initiator, while the other 
plays the role of the responder. The initiator usually lets 
the responder know something about the initiator's 
availability for dating, that is, how much the initiator 
would like to date the responder or how likely the initiator 
would be to go out on a date with the responder. 
Tonight, you will get to play the role of the 
responder. Three other people who are here tonight will be 
shown your photo and will be asked to communicate to you 
something about their availability to go out on a date with 
you. These initiators will tell you, in writing, how likely 
they would be to go out on a date with you. The next move 
will be yours. You will receive, in a little while, photos 
of 3 initiators who have seen your photo along with their 
ratings of how likely each of them would be to accept a date 
with you. You will then get to pick one of the three. Each 
of the initiators get to pick one of the three responders 
(you and two other people who are here tonight) • If two of 
you pick each other, you will get to meet and discuss the 
possibility of having a date. If the two of you agree to go 
out, each of you will receive $13 to spend on that date. If 
for any reason, you don't get a date, you will be paid $3 
for your participation". 
APPENDIX C 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT FORMS 
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87 
I am participating in this study voluntarily, and for 
doing so I will receive extra-credit in my Psychology course 
and will be paid an amount, in cash, from $3 to $13. 
I am giving my consent to be photographed as part of 
the experimental procedure. I am aware that my photo will 
be used only in this present study and will be returned to 
me before I leave today. 
Please sign here 
88 
Number-Choosing Opportunity 
You now have the opportunity of choosing three numbers 
which you feel might also be chosen by a random number 
generator. If at least 2 of the numbers you pick are 
generated by the random number generating program in our 
computer you will receive $13. If less than 2 of your 
numbers are generated you will receive $3. You should be 
aware that your chance of receiving the $13 is "somewhat 
unlikely". 
I understand the above opportunity and agree to 
participate. 
(sign) 




You are also given the opportunity of selling the 
Number-Choosing opportunity back to us for a certain amount 
in cash. This amount must be greater than $3 and less than 
$13. But, if the amount you choose to sell the 
number-choosing-opportunity is greater than a specific 
"critical amount" you will have to participate in the 
number-choosing. 
I understand and agree to participate in this selling 
opportunity. 
(sign) 
I would like to sell the opportunity to choose numbers for: 




The summary table for the ANCOVA with Rating as the 
dependent variable is shown in Table D-1. Large effects 
were found for Photo Attractiveness, f(2, 104) = 26.34, 
Insert Table D-1 about here 
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£<.01, and Probability of Acceptance, f(2, 104) = 15.05, 
£<.01 (see Table D-1). Also significant was an effect for 
Group, f(16, 40) = 2.23, £<.05, and a Sex by Photo 
Attractiveness interaction, f(2, 104) = 4.27, £<.05. The 
summary table for the ANCOVA with Evaluation as the 
dependent variable is given in Table D-2. On this variable 
Insert Table D-2 about here 
the ANCOVA found large effects for Photo Attractiveness, 
f(2, 104) = 22.35, £<.01, Probability of Acceptance, f(2, 
104) = 25.47, £<.01, and the Sex by Probability 
Insert Table D-3 about here 
of Acceptance interaction, f(2, 104) = 5.90, £<.01 (see 
Table D-2). The summary table for the ANCOVA with Choice as 
the dependent variable is given in Table D-3. Here again 
large effects were found for Photo Attractiveness, 
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f(2, 104) = 43.22, p<.01, and for Probability of Acceptance, 
K(2, 104) = 6.50, £<.01 (see Table D-3). 
Table D-4 contains the means of the Rating, Evaluation, 
and Choice residuals in each condition. The residual scores 
Insert Table D-4 about here 
---------- -··- ·- -- ----
for a given variable are the difference between the original 
value for that variable and the predicted value (see Table 
D-4). The means for the Rating residuals are displayed in 
Figure 11. It is evident from a visual comparison of 
Figures 7 and 11 that although the residual means are 
smaller quantities the trends from the Rating scores and the 
Insert Figure 11 about here 
Rating residuals remain similar (see Figures 7 and 11). 
Moreover, a trend analysis using directional F values 
(direction of trend predicted) found an even greater effect 
------· ----·----·-·--·-
Insert Figure 12 about here 
(non-monotonicity) for females in the low Probability of 
Acceptance condition, F(1, 104) = 8.07, p<.01. The means 
for the Evaluation residuals appear in Figure 12. 
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Again, similar trend curves result from these means, and the 
effect for Evaluation in the low Probability of Acceptance 
Insert Figure 13 about here 
-· ------------------- ----
condition is slightly enhanced, f(1, 104) = 2.72, £<.10. 
Figure 13 illustrates the relationship between the means for 
the Choice residual. The curves from the Choice residual 
means failed to produce significant trends by either the 
standard or directional trend test. 
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Table 1 


























Mean [7.91 7.32 7.21] [6.36 6.04] [5.07 (4.54] 4.00} 
Note. Bracketed means are those not significantly different 
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Note. Bracketed means are those not significantly different 





Mean Risk Scores of Males and Females Across All Conditions 
Group (!! = 10) Males Females 
A-B 
Low-Low 4.50 3.90 
Low-Medium 4.27a 3.75 
Low-High 2.83b 3.75 
Medium-Low 4.20 3.10 
Medium-Medium 3.65 3.56b 
Medium-High 2.65 3.05a 
High-Low 4.65 5.00 
High-Medium 3.94b s.ooa 
High-High 3.82a 4.11b 
Note. A = Level of Stimulus Photo Attractiveness; B 
Probability of Acceptance. 
an = 11. bn = 9. 
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Table 4 
Summary Table for Analysis of Variance with Risk as Dependent 
Variable 
Source ss df MS 
Between Subjects 
Replication(Rep) 2.69 1 2.69 
Sex 0.20 1 0.20 
Sex* Rep 4.05 1 4.05 
Gr(Sex*Rep) 51.33 16 3.21 
Subno(Sex*Gr*Rep) 104.28 40 2.61 
Within Subjects 
A 34.73 2 17.37 
B 24.19 2 12.10 
A*B 1.78 4 0.45 
Sex* A 5.66 2 2.83 
Sex*B 7.23 2 3.62 
Sex*A*B 1.71 4 0.43 
Residual 128.21 104 1.23 
Note. A = Photo Attractiveness; B = Probability of 















§ummary Table for Analysis of Simple Main Effects of Risk 
Variable 
Source 
B at A(Low) 
B at A(Med) 
B at A(High) 
Residual 
B at A(Low) 
B at A(Med) 
































Summary Table for Analysis of Variance with Rating_3s 
p~pendent Variable 
Source ss df MS 
!?_etwe~n_ J:!~b j ects 
Replication(Rep) 14.17 1 14.17 
Sex 23.11 1 23.11 
Sex*Rep 1.33 1 1.33 
Gr(Sex*Rep) 125.41 16 7.84 
Subno(Sex*Gr*Rep) 172.72 40 4.32 
Wi thin __ ~ubj ects 
A 87.41 2 43.71 
B 52.12 2 26.06 
A*B 7.22 4 1.81 
Sex* A 13.59 2 6.80 
Sex*B 2.61 2 1.31 
Sex*A*B 3.31 4 0.83 
Residual 169.74 104 1. 63 
Note. A = Photo Attractiveness; B = Probability of 















Mean Scores of Males Across All Conditions 
Dependent Variable 
Group (Q = 10) Rating Evaluation Choice 
A-B 
Low-Low 3.50 2.45 3.00 
Low-Medium a 4.82 3.73 2.64 
Low-Highb 4.78 4.00 2.44 
Medium-Low 4.10 3.50 2.40 
Medium-Medium 5.00 3.80 1. 80 
Medium-High 6.60 5.35 1.40 
High-Low 6.30 3.65 1. 80 
High-Medium b 6.22 4.61 1. 33 
High-High a 7.27 5.27 1.18 
Note. A = Level of Stimulus Photo Attractiveness; B = 
Probability of Acceptance. 
a b n = 11. n = 9. 
Table 8 
Mean Scores of Females Across All Conditions 
Dependent Variable 
Group {Q = 10) Rating Evaluation Choice 
A-B 
Low-Low 3.30 3.05 2.90 
Low-Medium 3.90 3.20 2.40 
Low-High 4.65 3.45 2.50 
Medium-Low 5.05 3.85 2.10 
Medium-Medium b 5.44 4.17 2.00 
Medium-High a 4.73 4.00 1.55 
High-Low 4.20 3.60 1. 70 
High-Medium a 4.86 3.86 1.64 
High-Highb 6.33 4.89 1.22 
Note. A = Level of Stimulus Photo Attractiveness; B = 
Probability of Acceptance. 




Summary Table for Analysis of Variance -~i t_l!_~valua_tion a_§ 
_QeE_ens1e~t Variable 
Source ss df MS 
?e~ween Subjects 
Replication(Rep) 0.17 1 0.17 
Sex 3.33 1 3.33 
Sex*Rep 3.90 1 3.90 
Gr(Sex*Rep) 42.11 16 2.63 
Subno(Sex*Gr*Rep) 65.89 40 1. 65 
Within Subjects 
A 33.60 2 16.80 
B 38.80 2 19.40 
A*B 4.80 4 1.20 
Sex*A 0.47 2 0.24 
Sex*B 8.91 2 4.46 
Sex*A*B 4.45 4 1.11 
Residual 79.79 104 0.77 
Note. A = Photo Attractiveness; B = Probability of 















Summary Tabl_~or Analysis of Variance with Choice as 
Depend~_nt Variable 
Source ss df MS F 
Within Subjects 
A 42.43 2 21.22 35.43** 
B 11.01 2 5.51 9.19** 
A*B 1. 74 4 0.44 0.73 
Sex* A 0.26 2 0.13 0.22 
Sex*B 0.61 2 0.31 0.51 
Sex*A*B 1.60 4 0.40 0.67 
Residual 62.34 104 0.60 


















































Note. S# = Subject Number; SE = Self-Esteem; SA= Subject's 
Physical Attractiveness; AC =Attractive Choice;. 
Table 13 
Correlations P~_;-forme_~_ By Sex 
Bid 





















































Note. S# = Subject Number; SE = Self-Esteem; SA = Subject's 
Physical Attractiveness~ AC =Attractive Choice;. 
Table D-1 
Summary Table for Analysis of Covariance on Rating 
Source ss df MS 
Between Subjects 
SA(Sex*A*B) 217.46 18 12.08 
ES(Sex*A*B) 34.55 18 1.92 
G(Sex*A*B) 62.35 18 3.46 
Replication(Rep) 12.16 1 12.16 
Sex 0.36 1 0.36 
Sex*Rep 0.48 1 0.48 
Gr(Sex*Rep) 114.20 16 7.14 
Subno(Sex*Gr*Rep) 114.22 34 3.36 
Within Subjects 
A 0.59 2 0.30 
B 9.08 2 4.54 
A*B 1.95 4 0.49 
Sex* A 1.60 2 0.80 
Sex*B 2.17 2 1.09 
Sex*A*B 6.78 4 1. 70 
Residual 94.82 56 1.69 
Note. A = Photo Attractiveness; B = Probability of 


















Summary Table for Analysis of Covariance on Evaluation 
Source ss df MS F 
Between Subjects 
SA(Sex*A*B) 95.35 18 5.30 2.14 
ES(Sex*A*B) 11.73 18 0.65 0.26 
G(Sex*A*B) 19.91 18 1.11 0.45 
Replication(Rep) 0.04 1 0.04 0.02 
Sex 0.68 1 0.68 0.27 
Sex*Rep 2.84 1 2.84 1.15 
Gr(Sex*Rep) 39.64 16 2.48 1.44 
Subno(Sex*Gr*Rep) 58.37 34 1.72 
Within Subjects 
A 0.10 2 0.05 0.06 
B 10.02 2 5.05 6.47** 
A*B 0.50 4 0.13 0.17 
Sex* A 0.56 2 0.28 0.36 
Sex*B 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 
Sex*A*B 2.64 4 0.66 0.85 
Residual 43.77 56 0.78 
Note. A = Photo Attractiveness; B = Probability of 
Acceptance; Gr = Group; Subno = Subject Number. **p<.01. 
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Table D-3 
Summary Table for Analysis of Covariance on Choice 
Source ss df MS F 
!3~tw~e_!l. -~ubjects 
SA(Sex*A*B) 49.96 18 2.78 39.71** 
ES(Sex*A*B) 4.54 18 0.25 3.57 
G(Sex*A*B) 9.21 18 0.51 7.29 
Replication(Rep) 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
Sex 0.03 1 0.03 0.43 
Sex*Rep 0.10 1 0.10 1.43 
Gr(Sex*Rep) 1.07 16 0.07 0.26 
Subno(Sex*Gr*Rep) 9.11 34 0.27 
Within Subject:_§_ 
A 1.49 2 0.75 1.17 
B 3.94 2 1.97 3.08 
A*B 0.87 4 0.22 0.34 
Sex* A 0.94 2 0.47 0.73 
Sex*B 1.02 2 0.51 0.80 
Sex*A*B 1. 91 4 0.48 0.75 
Residual 35.82 56 0.64 
Not~ A = Photo Attractiveness; B = Probability of 
Acceptance; Gr = Group; Subno = Subject Number. **£<.01. 
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Table D-4 
Means of Dependent Variable Residuals 
Dependent Variable Residuals 
Males Females 
Condition Rating Eval Choice Rating Eval Choice 
A-B 
Low-Low -1.62 -1.49 1. 00 -1.58 -0.80 
Low-Med -0.09 -0.13 0.64 -1.05 -0.67 
Low-Hi 0.21 0.05 0.56 -0.35 -0.44 
Med-Low -0.76 -0.40 0.40 0.15 0.00 
Med-Med -0.05 -0.19 -0.20 0.38 0.24 
Med-Hi 1.46 1.41 -0.60 -0.16 0.15 
Hi-Low 1.53 -0.34 -0.40 -0.86 -0.32 
Hi-Med 1.24 0.71 -0.67 0.02 0.20 
Hi-Hi 2.10 1.37 -0.82 1.38 1.01 
Note. A = Level of Stimulus Photo Attractiveness; B = 












figure 1. Hypothetical value curve for risk seeking and risk 
aversion. 
Figure 2. Subjective probability weighting curve. 
Figure 3. Hypothetical preference curve derived from the 
Portfolio theory formula with T = 0.9985. 
F_i_gu!"~- _1:. Mean preference response from Shanteau and Nagy 
(1979) subjects across 4 levels of Attractiveness and 7 
levels of Probability of Acceptance. 
figu~e 5. Hypothetical preference curves derived from the 
Portfolio theory formula with T = 1.000 across 8 levels of 
Attractiveness and 10 Levels of Probability of Acceptance. 
Figur~_i. Hypothetical preference curves derived from the 
Portfolio theory formula with T = 0.862 across 8 levels of 
Attractiveness and 10 levels of Probability of Acceptance. 
~~q~£~· Mean scores of the Risk variable across 3 levels 
of Attractiveness and 3 levels of Probability of Acceptance. 
Figure 8. Mean scores of the Rating variable across 3 levels 
of Attractiveness and 3 levels of Probability of Acceptance. 
Figure 9. Mean scores of the Evaluation variable across 3 
levels of Attractiveness and 3 levels of Probability of 
Acceptance. 
Figure 10. Mean scores of the Choice variable across 3 
levels of Attractiveness and 3 levels of Probability of 
Acceptance. 
Figu~~-11. Mean scores of the Rating residual across 3 
levels of Attractiveness and 3 levels of Probability of 
Acceptance. 
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Fiqu~~ 12. Mean scores of the Evaluation residual across 3 
levels of Attrac~iveness and 3 levels of Probability of 
Acceptance. 
Figure 13. Mean scores of the Choice residual across 3 
levels of Attractiveness and 3 levels of Probability of 
Acceptance. 
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